logic - What is the nature of Aristotle's differentia? - Philosophy ...
A species is defined by giving its genus and its differentia: the genus is the kind under which the species falls, and the differentia tells what characterizes the species within that genus. As an example, human might be defined as animal (genus) having the capacity to reason (differentia)." And see : Edgar Herbert Granger, Aristotle on Genus ...
philosophy of mathematics - Genus-Differentia and Mathematical ...
2012年6月20日 · My initial gut reaction upon reading about SEAR was that it is to the type of definition I described as classical foundations (say ZF set theory) are to the genus-differentia description. And the authors of that page, too, seem to feel that distinguishing "relationship" as a fundamental new type within the universe of discourse rather than ...
logic - Who invented definitions? - Philosophy Stack Exchange
2019年2月10日 · A species is defined by giving its genus (genos) and its differentia (diaphora): the genus is the kind under which the species falls, and the differentia tells what characterizes the species within that genus. As an example, human might be defined as animal (the genus) having the capacity to reason (the differentia).
epistemology - What are some methods of defining things?
2011年9月5日 · In Euclidian Geometry a square is a surface (Genus Proximum) which is both equilateral and right-angled (Differentia specifica). By convention: A definition that intentionally restricts the range of the defined notion to a particular field of application. There are numerous such examples in science.
How many predicables does Aristotle have? - Philosophy Stack …
2017年4月10日 · This "what" can be fourfold: a definition (the essence), a unique property, a genus (including the differentia) or an accident. Man is a rational animal (definition), rationality being its unique prop; its genus is animal and two-handed is an accidental property. –
metaphysics - Why isn't differentia just quality in Aristotle ...
2020年8月25日 · Quality is an accident, but specific differences (differentiæ) pertain to substance and essence. St. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes substantial or essential differences from accidental differences, showing that the former is known by the latter, as cause is known by its effect: De Ente et Essentia, cap. 4:
descartes - Sartre and the cogito - Philosophy Stack Exchange
2015年5月8日 · What Sartre did challenge, was Descartes's Cogito-related metaphysical conclusion that the I was a thinking substance. The I that appears on the horizon of the 'I think' is not given as a producer of conscious spontaneity. Consciousness is produced over against it and moves towards it, comes to meet it. This is all that can be said.
ethics - Is there a name for the "somebody else will do it anyway ...
2020年6月25日 · However, apart from the ethical context, there have been similar arguments around in medieval metaphysics and philosophy of science as well. Perhaps, they all should be systematised into one definite fallacy (argumentum ex non differentia?) that would lay down the core idea. See: Jonathan Glover and Martin J. Scott-Taggart.
analytic philosophy - Is it possible for the sentence "bachelors are ...
2023年9月1日 · You are asking as if "bachelors are unmarried" expresses some fact of the matter. But it is merely a reflection of the prevailing use of "bachelor" and "married", certainty or uncertainty does not apply to such things.
theology - How can God be in the genus of efficient causes ...
Also, St. Thomas gives a few concise arguments for why God it is impossible for God to be the genus of any thing (impossibile est Deum esse genus alicuius) in Compendium Theologiæ cap. 13: God cannot be a genus. What a thing is, but not that it is, comes from its genus; the thing is established in its proper existence by specific differences.